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Pufferfish is a Bayesian privacy framework for designing and analyzing privacy mechanisms. It refines differen-
tial privacy, the current gold standard in data privacy, by allowing explicit prior knowledge in privacy analysis.
Through these privacy frameworks, a number of privacy mechanisms have been developed in literature.
In practice, privacy mechanisms often need be modified or adjusted to specific applications. Their privacy
risks have to be re-evaluated for different circumstances. Moreover, computing devices only approximate
continuous noises through floating-point computation, which is discrete in nature. Privacy proofs can thus be
complicated and prone to errors. Such tedious tasks can be burdensome to average data curators. In this paper,
we propose an automatic verification technique for Pufferfish privacy. We use hidden Markov models to specify
and analyze discretized Pufferfish privacy mechanisms. We show that the Pufferfish verification problem in
hidden Markov models is NP-hard. Using Satisfiability Modulo Theories solvers, we propose an algorithm to
analyze privacy requirements. We implement our algorithm in a prototypical tool called FAIER, and present
several case studies. Surprisingly, our case studies show that naïve discretization of well-established privacy
mechanisms often fail, witnessed by counterexamples generated by FAIER. In discretized Above Threshold, we
show that it results in absolutely no privacy. Finally, we compare our approach with testing based approach on
several case studies, and show that our verification technique can be combined with testing based approach
for the purpose of (i) efficiently certifying counterexamples and (ii) obtaining a better lower bound for the
privacy budget ϵ .
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Formal security models.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Pufferfish privacy, Formal verification, Hidden Markov models
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy has been a hotly debated issue since late nineteenth century [Warren and Brandeis 1890].
With the advent of social media, privacy is perhaps one of themost relevant topics nowadays. Indeed,
numerous privacy measures for publishing data have been proposed [Fung et al. 2010; Sweeney
2002]. Whether these measures are taken properly and effectively concerns every individual.
Because of its impact on society, the research community has been investigating the problem for
many years [Sweeney 2002].
Differential privacy is a framework for designing and analyzing privacy measures [Dwork 2006;
Dwork and Roth 2014]. In the framework, data publishingmechanisms are formalized as randomized
algorithms. On any input data set, such mechanisms return randomized answers to queries. In the
typical setting of differential privacy, data sets cannot be accessed directly. Only output distributions
can convey information about entries in data sets. In order to preserve privacy, differential privacy
aims to ensure that similar output distributions are yielded on similar input data sets. Differential
privacy moreover allows data curators to evaluate privacy and utility quantitatively. The framework
has attracted lots of attentions from academia and industry.
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Pufferfish is a more recent privacy framework which refines differential privacy [Kifer and
Machanavajjhala 2014]. In differential privacy, there is no explicit correlation among entries in data
sets during privacy analysis. The no free lunch theorem in data privacy shows that prior knowledge
about data sets is crucial to privacy analysis. The Pufferfish privacy framework hence allows data
curators to analyze privacy with prior knowledge about data sets. Under the Bayesian privacy
framework, it is shown that differential privacy preserves the same level of privacy if there is no
correlation among entries in data sets (Theorem 2 in [Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2014]).
For differential and Pufferfish privacy, data publishing mechanisms are analyzed –often on
paper– with sophisticated mathematical tools. The complexity of the problem is high [Gaboardi
et al. 2020], and moreover, it is well-known that such proofs are very subtle and error-prone. For
instance, several published variations of differentially private mechanisms are shown to violate
privacy [Chen and Machanavajjhala 2015; Lyu et al. 2017]. In order to minimize proof errors
and misinterpretation, the formal method community has also started to develop techniques for
checking differentially private mechanisms, such as verification techniques [Barthe et al. 2013;
Gaboardi et al. 2013; Tschantz et al. 2011], and techniques based on testing [Ding et al. 2018].
Reality nevertheless can be more complicated than mathematical proofs. Existing privacy mecha-
nisms hardly fit their data publishing requirements perfectly. These algorithms may be implemented
differently when used in practice. Majority of differentially private mechanisms utilize continuous
perturbations by applying the Laplace mechanism. Computing devices however only approximate
continuous noises through floating-point computation, which is discrete in nature. Care must
be taken lest privacy can be lost during such finite approximations [Mironov 2012]. Moreover,
adding continuous noises may yield uninterpretable outputs for categorical or discrete numerical
data. Discrete noises are hence necessary for such data. A challenging task for data curators is to
guarantee that the implementation (discrete in nature) meets the specification (often continuous
distributions are used). It is often time consuming – if not impossible, to carry out privacy analysis
for each of the modifications. Automated verification and testing techniques are in this case a
promising methodology for preserving privacy.
In this work, we take a different approach to solve the problems above. We focus on discretized
Pufferfish privacy, and propose a lightweight but automatic technique. We propose a formal model
for data publishing mechanisms and reduce Pufferfish privacy into a verification problem for hidden
Markov models (HMMs). Through our formalization, data curators can specify and verify their
specialized privacy mechanisms without going through tedious mathematical proofs.
More concretely, we formalize discretized Pufferfish privacy mechanisms on HMMs. A data
publishing mechanism is the underlying Markov chain associated with the HMM. Attackers’ prior
knowledge is then modeled by initial state distributions. Based on our proposal, we give a formal
model for the geometric mechanism and analyze it with Pufferfish privacy.
Below we list main contributions of our paper, comparing to closely related works:
• Discretized Mechanisms as HMMs: We propose to specify ϵ-Pufferfish privacy with discretized
mechanisms as HMMs. Informally, the parameter ϵ bounds the distance of outputs generated
by input distributions, which arise from certain secrets and prior knowledge on databases.
Our modeling formalism is inspired by the work [Liu et al. 2018], where Markov chains are
used to model differential privacy with discretized mechanisms. They extend the probabilistic
temporal logic to specify constraints for a fixed output sequence as a logical formula. Then,
the differential privacy problem reduces to a model checking problem with respect to the
logical formulas of all the outputs. Even for fixed length, the formula to verify would be of
conjunctions of all output sequences bounded by this length, making the model checking
algorithm rather complicated. Besides, we will illustrate in the paper that Markov chains
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models often are larger than corresponding HMMs, as each state can only encode one output.
Interestingly, HMMs allow us to explain subtleties between differential privacy and Pufferfish
privacy concisely. Briefly, differential privacy only inspects neighboring databases while
Pufferfish privacy inspects distributions of databases obtained by prior knowledge and secrets.
Accordingly, HMMs focus on computing the distribution of observations given some initial
distribution, whereas in Markov chains every state is labelled by at most one observation.
This strongly favors our formalization as the right abstraction for Pufferfish privacy.
• Verification Problem: We show that Pufferfish privacy reduces to a verification problem for
HMMs. Using a reduction from the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT), the verification
problem proves to be NP-hard. Similar hardness results are shown to hold for loop-free
programs for differential privacy [Gaboardi et al. 2020].
On the practical side, nevertheless, using Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers, we
design a verification algorithm which automatically verifies privacy properties. The basic
idea is to construct an SMT query ϕM so that a privacy mechanismM satisfies ϵ-Pufferfish
privacy if and only if ϕM is not satisfiable. The SMT query ϕM is then sent to an SMT
solver or a qualifier elimination tool to check satisfiability. Differential and Pufferfish privacy
analysis are hence performed automatically.
• Experimental Results:We have implemented our algorithm in a prototypical tool called FAIER
(the pufferFish privAcy verifIER). We consider privacy mechanisms for bounded discrete
numerical queries such as counting. For those queries, classical continuous perturbations
may give unusable answers or even lose privacy [Mironov 2012]. We hence discretize privacy
mechanisms by applying discrete perturbations on such queries. We report case studies
derived from discretizing differentially private mechanisms. Our studies show that naïve
discretization may induce significant privacy risks. For the Above Threshold example, we
show that discretization does not have any privacy at all. For this example, our tool generates
counterexamples for an arbitrary small security budget ϵ .
Another interesting problem for differential privacy is to find the largest lower bound of ϵ ,
below which the mechanism will not be differentially private. We discuss below, how our
verification approach can be combined with testing techniques for this purpose.
• Verification Algorithm and Testing Combined: Our tool FAIER returns a counterexample if the
checked query/property does not hold. The counterexamples can be directly used to obtain
violations of differential and Pufferfish privacy. Another recent work based on testing is
presented in [Ding et al. 2018]. We provide a deep investigation of how the two approaches
differ and how then can be combined. In details:
– Efficiency & Precision: As expected, testing based approach [Ding et al. 2018] can be more
efficient, as it does not need to explore all reaching states.
We show cases when testing fails to find counterexamples, thus falsely claiming differential
privacy, whereas our tool FAIER can find counterexamples. On the other side, for cases
close to the borders, testing may provide spurious counterexamples.
– Counterexample Certification: Based on previous observations, we argue that testing and
verification techniques can be effectively combined. We first apply testing to check whether
counterexample candidates can be found. For the given counterexample candidate, our
tool FAIER can be applied to check validity of the counterexample. If no counterexample is
found using testing, FAIER can be used to certify the correctness of the mechanism.
– Finding Lower Bounds: In differential and Pufferfish privacy, it is important to synthesize
lower bounds. In [Bichsel et al. 2018], the authors propose a method combining sampling
and searching, to find a lower bound ϵ of differential privacy algorithm, which is the
largest ϵ that an randomized algorithm is not ϵ-DP. Extending the method to pufferfish
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privacy is not trivial: The databases distribution must be fixed in order to sample and
test, which does not allow prior knowledge with uncertainty or partial knowledge such as
database d is chosen with an unknown parameter p. We propose an alternative approach
based on HMMs to find a lower bound for both differential and Pufferfish privacy. The
counterexample certification routine can be used to detect lower bound by combining
testing and our verification approaches. Testing can be used first to identify possible
interval of the lower bound. Then, we can apply our tool to verify the values in the interval,
combined with searching methods such as simple binary search. Using our approach, the
obtained lower bound be arbitrarily close to the true lower bound.
Organization of the paper. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. Differential and Pufferfish privacy
frameworks are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 demonstrates subtleties between differential
and Pufferfish privacy using the geometric mechanism as the running example. In Section 5, we
investigate the complexity of the Pufferfish verification problem and propose a verification algorithm
for Pufferfish privacy. Our implementation and evaluation results are given in Section 6 as well as
careful examination of classic differential privacy mechanisms. We make comparisons of our tool
and the tool in statistical testing techniques in Section 7 and provide insight on effectively combine
verification and testing techniques. Related work are described in Section 8 and we conclude this
work in Section 9.
2 PRELIMINARIES
AMarkov Chain K = (S,p) consists of a finite set S of states and a transition distribution p : S × S →
[0, 1] such that ∑t ∈S p(s, t) = 1 for every s ∈ S . A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) H = (K ,Ω,o)
is a Markov chain K = (S,p) with a finite set Ω of observations and an observation distribution
o : S × Ω → [0, 1] such that ∑ω ∈Ω o(s,ω) = 1 for every s ∈ S . Intuitively, the states of HMMs are
not observable. External observers do not know the current state of an HMM. Instead, they have
a state distribution (called information state) π : S → [0, 1] with ∑s ∈S π (s) = 1 to represent the
likelihood of each state in an HMM.
Let H = ((S,p),Ω,o) be an HMM and π an initial state distribution. The HMM H can be seen
as a (randomized) generator for sequences of observations. The following procedure generates
observation sequences of an arbitrary length:
(1) t ← 0.
(2) Choose an initial state s0 ∈ S by the initial state distribution π .
(3) Choose an observation ωt by the observation distribution o(st , •).
(4) Choose a next state st+1 by the transition distribution p(st , •).
(5) t ← t + 1 and go to 3.
Given an observation sequence ω = ω0ω1 · · ·ωk and a state sequence s = s0s1 · · · sk , it is not hard
to compute the probability of observing ω along s on an HMM H = ((S,p),Ω,o) with an initial
state distribution π . Precisely,
Pr(ω, s |H ) = Pr(ω |s,H ) × Pr(s,H )
= [o(s0,ω0)· · ·o(sk ,ωk )]×[π (s0)p(s0, s1)· · ·p(sk−1, sk )]
= π (s0)o(s0,ω0) · p(s0, s1)· · ·p(sk−1, sk )o(sk ,ωk ). (1)
Since state sequences are not observable, we are interested in the probability Pr(ω |H ) for a given
observation sequence ω. Using (1), we have Pr(ω |H ) = ∑s ∈Sk+1 Pr(ω, s |H ). But the summation has
|S |k+1 terms and is hence inefficient to compute. An efficient algorithm is available to compute the
probability αt (s) for the observation sequence ω0ω1 · · ·ωt with the state s at time t [Rabiner 1989].
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Consider the following definition:
α0(s) = π (s)o(s,ω0) (2)
αt+1(s ′) =
[∑
s ∈S
αt (s)p(s, s ′)
]
o(s ′,ωt+1). (3)
Informally, α0(s) is the probability that the initial state is s with the observation ω0. By induction,
αt (s) is the probability that the t-th state is s with the observation sequence ω0ω1 · · ·ωt . The
probability of observing ω = ω0ω1 · · ·ωk is therefore the sum of probabilities of observing ω over
all states s . Thus Pr(ω |H ) = ∑s ∈S αk (s).
3 PUFFERFISH PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
Differential privacy is a privacy framework for design and analysis of data publishing mecha-
nisms [Dwork and Roth 2014]. Let X denote the set of data entries. A data set of size n is an element
in Xn . Two data sets d, d′ ∈ Xn are neighbors (written ∆(d, d′) ≤ 1) if d and d′ are identical except
for at most one data entry. A data publishing mechanism (or simply mechanism)M is a randomized
algorithm which takes a data set d as inputs. A mechanism satisfies ϵ-differential privacy if its
output distributions differ by at most the multiplicative factor eϵ on every neighboring data sets.
Definition 3.1. Let ϵ ≥ 0. A mechanismM is ϵ-differentially private if for all r ∈ range(M) and
data sets d, d
′ ∈ Xn with ∆(d, d′) ≤ 1, we have
Pr(M(d) = r ) ≤ eϵ Pr(M(d′) = r ).
Intuitively, ϵ-differential privacy ensures similar output distributions on similar data sets. Limited
differential information about each data entry is revealed and individual privacy is hence preserved.
Though, differential privacy makes no assumption nor uses any prior knowledge about data sets.
For data sets with correlated data entries, differential privacy may reveal too much information
about individuals. Consider, for instance, a data set of family members. If a family member has
contracted a highly contagious disease, all family are likely to have the same disease. In order
to decide whether a specific family member has contracted the disease, it suffices to determine
whether any member has the disease. It appears that specific information about an individual can
be inferred from differential information when data entries are correlated. Differential privacy may
be ineffective to preserve privacy in such circumstances [Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2011].
Pufferfish is a Bayesian privacy framework which refines differential privacy. A theorem [Kifer
and Machanavajjhala 2014] shows how to define differential privacy equivalently in Pufferfish
framework. In Pufferfish privacy, a random variableD represents a data set drawn from a distribution
θ ∈ D. The set D of distributions formalizes prior knowledge about data sets, such as whether
data entries are independent or correlated. Moreover, a set S of secrets and a set Spairs ⊆ S × S of
discriminative secret pairs formalize the information to be protected. A mechanism M satisfies
ϵ-Pufferfish privacy if its output distributions differ by at most the multiplicative factor eϵ when
conditioned on all the secret pairs in Spairs.
Definition 3.2. Let S be a set of secrets, Spairs ⊂ S × S a set of discriminative secret pairs, D a
set of data set distributions scenarios, and ϵ ≥ 0, a mechanismM is ϵ-Pufferfish private if for all
r ∈ range(M), (si , sj ) ∈ Spairs, θ ∈ D with Pr(si |θ ) , 0 and Pr(sj |θ ) , 0, we have
Pr(M(D) = r |si ,θ ) ≤ eϵ Pr(M(D) = r |sj ,θ )
where D is a random variable with the distribution θ .
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In the definition, Pr(si |θ ) , 0 and Pr(sj |θ ) , 0 ensure the probabilities Pr(M(D) = r |si ,θ )
and Pr(M(D) = r |sj ,θ ) are defined. Hence Pr(M(D) = r |s,θ ) is the probability of observing
r conditioned on the secret s and the data set distribution θ . Informally, ϵ-Pufferfish privacy
ensures similar output distributions on discriminative secrets and prior knowledge. Since limited
information is revealed from prior knowledge, each pair of discriminative secrets is protected.
4 GEOMETRIC MECHANISM AS HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL
We first recall in Subsection 4.1 the definition of geometric mechanism, a well-known discrete
mechanism for differential privacy. In Subsection 4.2, we then recall an example exploiting Markov
chains to model geometric mechanisms, followed by our modeling formalism using HMMs in
Subsection 4.3.
4.1 Geometric Mechanism
Let us first consider a simple data set with only two data entries. Each entry denotes whether an
individual has a certain disease. Given such a data set, we wish to know how many individuals
contract the disease in the data set. More generally, a counting query returns the number of entries
satisfying a given predicate in a data set d ∈ Xn . The number of individuals contracting the disease
in a data set is hence a counting query. Note that the difference of counting query results on
neighboring data sets is at most 1.
It is easy to see how counting queries may reveal sensitive information about individuals. For
instance, suppose we know John’s record is in the data set. We immediately infer that John has
contracted the disease if the query answer is 2. In order to protect privacy, several mechanisms are
designed to answer counting queries.
Consider a counting query f : Xn → {0, 1, . . . ,n}. Let α ∈ (0, 1). The α-geometric mechanism
Gf for the counting query f on the data set d outputs f (d)+Y on a data set d where Y is a random
variable with the geometric distribution [Ghosh et al. 2009, 2012]:
Pr[Y = y] = 1 − α1 + α α
|y | for y ∈ Z
For any neighboring data sets d, d
′ ∈ Xn , recall that | f (d) − f (d′)| ≤ 1. If f (d) = f (d′), the α-
geometric mechanism has the same output distribution for f on d and d
′
. If | f (d) − f (d′)| = 1, by a
simple calculation one can conclude that Pr(Gf (d) = r ) ≤ e− lnα Pr(Gf (d′) = r ) for any neighboring
d, d
′
and r ∈ Z. The α-geometric mechanism is − lnα-differentially private for any counting query
f . To achieve ϵ-differential privacy using the α-geometric mechanism, one simply chooses α = e−ϵ .
Observe the range of the geometric mechanism is Z. It may give nonsensical outputs such as
negative integers for non-negative queries. The truncated α -geometric mechanism over {0, 1, . . . ,n}
outputs f (d) + Z where Z is a random variable with the distribution:
Pr[Z = z] =

0 if z < −f (x)
α f (x )
1+α if z = −f (x)
1−α
1+α α
|z | if − f (x) < z < n − f (x)
αn−f (x )
1+α if z = n − f (x)
0 if z > n − f (x)
Note the range of the truncated α-geometric mechanism is {0, 1, . . . ,n}. The truncated α-geometric
mechanism is also− lnα-differentially private for any counting query f . What’s more, the geometric
mechanism surprisingly achieves an effect of maximal utility [Ghosh et al. 2009, 2012] for arbitrary
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fixed counting query and differential privacy level.Wewill study several examples of thismechanism
to get a better understanding of Pufferfish privacy and how we use models to analyze it.
4.2 Differential Privacy Using Markov Chains
We present a simple example taking from [Liu et al. 2018], slightly adapted to our setting for
analyzing different models. To be specific, the Markov chain and the hidden Markov model are
analyzed.
output
0˜ 1˜ 2˜
in
pu
t 0 2/3 1/6 1/6
1 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 1/6 1/6 2/3
(a) 12 -Geometric Mechanism
0
1
2
0˜
1˜
2˜
1
6
1
3
2
3
(b) Markov Chain
0
2/3:0˜
1/6:1˜
1/6:2˜
1
1/3:0˜
1/3:1˜
1/3:2˜
2
1/6:0˜
1/6:1˜
2/3:2˜
(c) Hidden Markov Model
Fig. 1. Truncated 12 -Geometric Mechanism
Example 4.1. To see how differential privacy works, consider the truncated 12 -geometric mecha-
nism (Fig. 1a). In the table, we consider a counting query f : X2 → {0, 1, 2}. For any data set d,
the mechanism outputs j when f (d) = i with probability indicated at the (i, j)-entry in the table.
For instance, the mechanism outputs 0˜, 1˜, and 2˜ with probabilities 23 ,
1
6 , and
1
6 respectively when
f (d) = 0.
Let f be the query counting the number of individuals contracting a disease. Consider a data set
d whose two members (including John) have contracted the disease. The number of individuals
contracting the disease is 2 and hence f (d) = 2. From the table in Fig. 1a, we see the mechanism
answers 0˜, 1˜, and 2˜ with probabilities 16 ,
1
6 , and
2
3 respectively. Suppose we obtain another data
set d
′
by replacing John with an individual who does not contract the disease. The number of
individuals contracting the disease for the new data set is 1 and thus f (d′) = 1. From the same
table, we see the mechanism answers 0˜, 1˜, and 2˜ with the probability 13 .
The probabilities of observing 0˜ on the data sets d and d
′
are respectively 16 and
1
3 . They differ
by the multiplicative factor 2. For other outputs, their observation probabilities are also bounded
by the same factor. The truncated 12 -geometric mechanism is hence ln(2)-differentially private. ■
In order to formally analyze privacy mechanisms, we specify them as probabilistic models. Fig. 1b
shows a Markov chain for the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism. We straightly turn inputs and
outputs of the table in Fig. 1a into states of the Markov chain and output probabilities into transition
probabilities. In the figure, thin arrows denote transitions with probability 16 ; medium arrows denote
transitions with probability 13 ; thick arrows denote transitions with probability
2
3 . For instance,
state 0 can transit to state 0˜ with probability 23 while it can transit to the state 1˜ with probability
1
6 .
The Markov chain model is quite simple for this case. Though, for a much more complex privacy
mechanism with plenty steps of transitions, roles of states of the Markov chain can become hazy:
some states for inputs, some states for outputs while the rest are just interval steps without any
practical meaning. In a privacy mechanism what people can observe are only the outputs. In next
subsection we discuss how to use HMMs, i.e., Markov chains with partial observations, to model
the mechanism.
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4.3 Pufferfish Privacy Using Hidden Markov Models
Ourmodeling strategy using HMMs is rather straightforward.We denote the information about data
sets as states. Similarly, possible outputs of the mechanism are denoted by states with corresponding
observations. The transition distribution then specifies the randomized algorithm for the privacy
mechanism on data sets. In simple cases, the privacy mechanism can just be encoded into states
without translations. For differential privacy, neighboring data sets are denoted by pairs of initial
information states. Privacy analysis can then be performed by comparing observation probabilities
from the two initial information states. We illustrate the ideas in examples.
Example 4.2. Fig. 1c gives an HMM for the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism. For any counting
query f from X2 to {0, 1, 2}, it suffices to represent each d ∈ X2 by f (d) because the mechanism
only depends on f (d). The order of entries, for instance, is irrelevant to the mechanism. We hence
have the states 0, 1 and 2 denoting the set { f (d) : d ∈ X2} in the figure. Let {0˜, 1˜, 2˜} be the set of
observations. We encode output probabilities into observation probabilities at states. At the state 0,
for instance, 0˜, 1˜, 2˜ can all be observed with probability 23 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 respectively. It is obvious that the
number of states are reduced by half and there is no transition in the model.
Fix an order for states, say, 0, 1, 2. An information state can be represented by an element in
[0, 1]3. In differential privacy, we would like to analyze probabilities of every observation from
neighboring data sets. For counting queries, neighboring data sets can change query results by
at most 1. Let d be a data set. Consider the initial information state π = (0, 0, 1) corresponding to
f (d) = 2. For any neighbor d′ of d, we have f (d′) = 2 or f (d′) = 1. It hence suffices to consider
corresponding information states π or τ = (0, 1, 0). Let’s compare the probability of obtaining
the observation ω = 1˜ from information states π and τ . Starting from π , we have α0 = π and
probabilities of 16 ,
1
3 and
1
6 respectively observing 1˜ at each state. So the probability of observing ω
is 16 . On the other hand, we have α0 = τ and the probability of observing ω is
1
3 . Similarly, one can
easily check the probabilities of observing 0˜ and 2˜ on any neighboring data sets and the ratio of
one probability over the other one under the same observation will not be more than 2. ■
As we can see from the example, the feature of HMMs allows us to get multiple observations at
one single state, which enables us to obtain smaller models.
Differential privacy provides a framework for quantitative privacy analysis. The framework
ensures similar output distributions regardless of the information about an arbitrary individual.
In other words, if an attacker gets certain prior knowledge about the data sets, chances are that
differential privacy will underestimate privacy risks.
Example 4.3. Consider a data set of a highly contagious disease about John and his family
member. An attacker wishes to know if John has contracted the disease. Since the data set keeps the
contagious disease about two family members, an attacker immediately deduces that the number
of individuals contracting the disease can only be 0 or 2. The attacker hence can infer whether John
has the disease by counting the number of individuals contracting the disease. If the number is 0,
John is free of the disease. If the number is 2, John has the disease. There is no other possibility.
Suppose a data curator tries to protect John’s privacy by employing the truncated 12 -geometric
mechanism (Fig. 1). If no one has contracted the disease, the mechanism outputs 0˜, 1˜, and 2˜ with
probabilities 23 ,
1
6 , and
1
6 respectively. If the two members have the disease, the probabilities are
1
6 ,
1
6 , and
2
3 . Note that it is 4 =
2/3
1/6 times more likely to observe 0˜ when there is no one contracting the
disease than there are two. Similarly, it is 4 times more likely to observe 2˜ in the other case. That
is, the 12 -geometric mechanism is 4 times more likely to output 0˜ when John has not contracted
the disease, while it is 4 times more likely to output 2˜ otherwise. The output distributions are
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thus bounded by the multiplicative factor of 4 = e ln(4). Recall that the 12 -geometric mechanism is
ln(2)-differentially private. The multiplicative factor 4 is twice as large as those guaranteed by the
1
2 -geometric mechanism. With the prior knowledge about the data set and disease, the attacker has
significantly more advantages to infer whether John has the disease or not. ■
Note that entries in the data set are correlated in the above example. Replacing a data entry
necessarily changes other data entries due to the nature of the data set. Since all data entries
are correlated, replacing one data entry does not yield feasible data sets with correlated entries.
Consequently, it is questionable to compare output distributions on data sets differing in only one
entry, which is examined by differential privacy.
The Pufferfish privacy framework generalizes neighboring data sets by data set distributions in
D. The new framework analyzes privacy mechanisms on data sets drawn from any distribution in
D. When data entries are correlated, one disregards infeasible data sets by removing them from
the support of data set distributions. Let us analyze the scenario in the previous example with the
Pufferfish privacy framework.
Example 4.4. Recall that data sets contain the information about a highly contagious disease
of two family members. For such data sets, either none or two can contract the disease. Other
cases are not feasible. Formally, let the set of data entries X = {0, 1}. There are four data sets in
X2. For any 0 < p < 1, define the data set distribution θp : X2 → [0, 1] as follows. θp (0, 0) = 1 − p,
θp (1, 1) = p, and θp (0, 1) = θp (1, 0) = 0. Consider the distribution set D = {θp : 0 < p < 1}. Note
that infeasible data sets are not in the support of θp .
Assume John’s entry is in the data set. Define the set of secrets S = {c,nc} where c denotes that
John has contracted the disease and nc denotes otherwise. Our set of discriminative secret pairs
Spairs is {(c,nc), (nc, c)}. That is, we would like to compare probabilities of all outcomes when John
has the disease or not.
When John has not contracted the disease, the only possible data set is (0, 0) by the data set
distribution θp . The probability of observing 0˜ therefore is 23 (Fig. 1a). When John has the disease,
the data set (0, 0) is not possible under the condition of the secrete and the data set distribution θp .
The only possible data set is (1, 1). The probability of observing 0˜ is 16 . Now
2
3 = Pr(Gf (D) = 0˜|nc,θp ) ≰ 2 ×
1
6 = 2 × Pr(Gf (D) = 0˜|c,θp ).
We conclude the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism does not conform to ln(2)-Pufferfish privacy.
Instead, it satisfies ln(4)-Pufferfish privacy. ■
In Pufferfish privacy, prior knowledge about data sets is crucial in privacy analysis. Such knowl-
edge is modeled as data set distributions in the Pufferfish framework. In the example, the data set
distribution θp specifies that the data sets (0, 1) and (1, 0) are infeasible. It hence ignores neighbors
of the data sets (0, 0) and (1, 1). Moreover, the data set distribution demands the comparison of
output distributions on the data set (0, 0) and (1, 1) by prior knowledge. The Pufferfish framework
hence analyzes privacy with respect to prior knowledge.
With the formal model (Fig. 1c), it is easy to perform privacy analysis in the Pufferfish framework.
More precisely, the underlyingMarkov chain along with observation distribution specify the privacy
mechanism on input data sets. Prior knowledge about data sets is nothing but distributions of
them. Since data sets are represented by various states, prior knowledge is naturally formalized as
initial information states in HMMs. For Pufferfish privacy analysis, we again compare observation
probabilities from initial information states conditioned on secret pairs. The standard algorithm for
HMMs allows us to perform more refined privacy analysis. It is interesting to observe the striking
similarity between the Pufferfish privacy framework and HMMs. In both cases, input data sets are
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Table 1. Pufferfish Analysis of 12 -Geometric Mechanism
0˜ 1˜ 2˜
without John’s record p
2−4p+4
6
−2p2+2p+1
6
p2+2p+1
6
with John’s record 4−3p12−6p
4−3p
12−6p
2
6−3p
unknown but specified by distributions. Information can only be released by observations because
inputs and hence computation are hidden from external attackers or observers. Pufferfish privacy
analysis with prior knowledge is hence closely related to observation probability analysis from
information states. Such similarities can easily be identified in the examples.
Example 4.5. Consider a non-contagious disease. An attacker may know that contracting the
disease is an independent event with probability p. Even though the attacker does not know how
many individuals have the disease exactly, he infers that the number of individuals contracting the
disease is 0, 1, and 2 with probabilities (1 − p)2, 2p(1 − p), and p2 respectively. The prior knowledge
corresponds to the initial information state π = ((1 − p)2, 2p(1 − p),p2) in Fig. 1c.
We analyze the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism with the prior knowledge as follows. Assume
John has contracted the disease. We would like to compare probabilities of observations 0˜, 1˜, and 2˜
given the prior knowledge and the presence or absence of John’s record.
Suppose John’s record is not in the data set. Starting from the initial information state π , we
have α0 = π and the probability of (1 − p)2 × 23 + 2p(1 − p) × 13 + p2 × 16 observing 0˜, which is
1
6p
2 − 23p + 23 . Similarly, the probabilities of observing 1˜ and 2˜ from π are − 13p2 + 13p + 16 and
1
6p
2 + 13p +
1
6 respectively.
Now suppose John’s record is indeed in the data set. Since John has the disease, the number
of individuals contracting the disease cannot be 0. By the prior knowledge, consider the initial
information state τ = (0, 2p(1−p)2p(1−p)+p2 ,
p2
2p(1−p)+p2 ) = (0,
2−2p
2−p ,
p
2−p ). To obtain the probability of observing
0˜ from τ , we compute from α0 = τ and then the probability of 13 × 2−2p2−p + 16 × p2−p , which is 4−3p12−6p .
Similarly, the probabilities of observing 1˜ and 2˜ from τ are 4−3p12−6p and
2
6−3p respectively. Table 1
summarizes observation probabilities.
For the observation 0˜, it is not hard to check 12 × 4−3p12−6p ≤ p
2−4p+4
6 ≤ 2 × 4−3p12−6p for any 0 < p < 1.
Similarly, we have 12 × 4−3p12−6p ≤ −2p
2+2p+1
6 ≤ 2 × 4−3p12−6p and 12 × 26−3p ≤ p
2+2p+1
6 ≤ 2 × 26−3p for
observations 1˜ and 2˜ respectively. Therefore, the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism satisfies ln(2)-
Pufferfish privacy when contracting the disease is independent. ■
The above example demonstrates that certain prior knowledge, such as independence of data
entries, is indeed not harmful to privacy under the Pufferfish framework. In [Kifer and Machanava-
jjhala 2014], it is shown that differential privacy is subsumed by Pufferfish privacy (Theorem 6.1).
The above example is also an instance of the general theorem but formalized in an HMM.
5 PUFFERFISH PRIVACY VERIFICATION
In this section, we formally define the verification problem for Pufferfish privacy and give the
computation complexity results in Section 5.1. Then we propose an algorithm to solve the problem
in Section 5.2.
Verifying Pufferfish Privacy in Hidden Markov Models 11
5.1 Complexity of Pufferfish Privacy Problem
We model the general Pufferfish privacy problems into hidden Markov models and the goal is to
check whether the privacy is preserved. First, we define the Pufferfish verification problem:
Definition 5.1. Given a set of secrets S, a set of discriminative secret pairs Spairs, a set of data
evolution scenarios D , ϵ > 0, along with mechanismM in a hidden Markov model H = (K ,Ω,o),
where probability distributions are all discrete. Deciding whetherM satisfies ϵ-Pufferfish (S, Spairs
D) privacy is the Pufferfish verification problem.
The HMM can be modeled by ourselves according to the mechanismM. The modeling intuition
is to use states and transitions to model the operations in the mechanism M, set target initial
distribution pairs according to prior knowledge D and discriminative secrets Spairs, and set target
outputs as observations in states. Then the goal turns into checking whether the probabilities under
the same observation sequence are mathematically similar (i.e. differ by at most the multiplicative
factor eϵ ), for every distribution pair and every observation sequence. Therefore, our task is to
find the observation sequence and distribution pair that make the observing probabilities differ the
most. That is, to satisfy pufferfish privacy, for every observation sequence ω = ω1ω2 . . ., secret pair
(si , sj ) ∈ Spairs and θ ∈ D, one should have
max
ω,(si ,sj ),θ
Pr(M(D) = ω |si ,θ ) − eϵ Pr(M(D) = ω |sj ,θ ) (4)
max
ω,(si ,sj ),θ
Pr(M(D) = ω |sj ,θ ) − eϵ Pr(M(D) = ω |si ,θ ) (5)
no more than 0. However, as the theorem we show below, to solve this problem is NP-hard (The
proof is in the Appendix).
Theorem 5.2. The Pufferfish verification problem is NP-hard.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first complexity result for the Pufferfish verification
problem. Note that differential privacy is subsumed by Pufferfish privacy. Recently a new work
[Barthe et al. 2020] gives undecidability results for differential privacy algorithms with continuous
noise. Instead, we focus on discrete mechanisms in Pufferfish privacy. There also exists a lower
computation complexity result if one focuses on differential privacy problems and uses less compli-
cated models such as Markov chains. However in Markov chains, some discretized mechanisms in
differential privacy, such as Above Threshold, can’t be modeled [Liu et al. 2018].
5.2 Verifying Pufferfish Privacy
Given the complexity lower bound in the previous section, next goal is to develop an algorithm to
verify ϵ-Pufferfish privacy on any given HMM. We employ Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
solvers in our algorithm. For all observation sequences of length k , we will construct an SMT query
to find a sequence violating ϵ-Pufferfish privacy. If no such sequence can be found, the given HMM
satisfies ϵ-Pufferfish privacy for all observation sequences of length k .
Let H = ((S,p),Ω,o) be an HMM, π ,τ two initial state distributions on S , c ≥ 0 a real number,
and k a positive integer. For a fixed observation sequence ω, computing the probability Pr(ω |π ,H )
of observing ω from π can be done in polynomial time [Rabiner 1989]. It is straightforward to
check if Pr(ω |π ,H ) > c · Pr(ω |τ ,H ) for any fixed observation sequence ω. One simply computes
the respective probabilities and then checks the inequality.
Our algorithm exploits the efficient algorithm for computing the probability of observation
sequences of HMMs. Rather than a fixed observation sequence, we declare k SMT variables
w0,w1, . . . ,wk−1 for observations at each step. The observation at each step is determined by
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Algorithm 1 Pufferfish Check
Require: H = ((S,p),Ω,o): a hidden Markov model; π ,τ : state distributions on S ; c : a non-negative
real number; k : a positive integer
Ensure: An SMT query q such that q is unsatisfiable iff Pr(ω |π ,H ) ≤ c · Pr(ω |τ ,H ) for every
observation sequences ω of length k
1: function PufferfishCheck(H , π0, π1, c , k)
2: for s ∈ S do
3: α0(s) ← Product(π (s), Select(w0,Ω,o(s, •)))
4: β0(s) ← Product(τ (s), Select(w0,Ω,o(s, •)))
5: end for
6: for t ← 1 to k − 1 do
7: for s ′ ∈ S do
8: αt (s ′) ← Product(Dot(αt−1,p(•, s ′)),
Select(wt,Ω,o(s ′, •)))
9: βt (s ′) ← Product(Dot(βt−1,p(•, s ′)),
Select(wt,Ω,o(s ′, •)))
10: end for
11: end for
12: return Gt(Sum(αk−1), Product(c, Sum(βk−1)) ∧∧k−1t=0 wt ∈ Ω)
13: end function
one of the k variables. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . ., ωm} be the set of observations. We define the SMT
expression Select (w, {ω1, ω2, . . ., ωm}, o(s, •)) equal to o(s,ω) when the SMT variable w is ω ∈ Ω.
It is straightforward to formulate by the SMT ite (if-then-else) expression:
ite(w = ω1,o(s,ω1),ite(w = ω2,o(s,ω2), . . . ,
ite(w = ωm ,o(s,ωm),w) . . .))
Using Select(w, {ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωm},o(s, •)), we construct an SMT expression to compute Pr(w|π ,H )
where w is a sequence of SMT variables ranging over the observations Ω (Algorithm 1). Recall the
equations (2) and (3). We simply replace the expression o(s,ω) with the new one Select(w, {ω1,
ω2, . . . , ωm}, o (s, •)) to leave the observation determined by the SMT variable w. In the algorithm,
we also use auxiliary functions. Product(smtExp0, . . . , smtExpm) returns the SMT expression de-
noting the product of smtExp0, . . . ,smtExpm . Similarly, Sum(smtExp0, . . . , smtExpm) returns the
SMT expression for the sum of smtExp0, . . . , smtExpm . Gt(smtExp0, smtExp1) returns the SMT
expression for smtExp0 greater than smtExp1. Finally, Dot ([a0, a1, . . . , an], [b0, b1, . . . , bn]) returns
the SMT expression for the inner product of the two lists of SMT expressions, namely,
Sum(Product(a0, b0), . . . , Product(an, bn)).
Algorithm 1 is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Let H = ((S,p),Ω,o) be a hidden Markov model, π ,τ state distributions on S , c > 0
a real number, and k > 0 an integer. Algorithm 1 returns an SMT query such that the query is
unsatisfiable iff Pr(ω |π ,H ) ≤ c · Pr(ω |τ ,H ) for every observation sequences ω of length k .
In practice, the setting of integer k is related to the model, depending on the length of observation
sequence we want to make sure to satisfy Pufferfish privacy. For instance, in the model of Fig. 1c,
the maximal length of observation sequence is 1 and thus k = 1. If there exist loops in models such
as Fig. 3, which implies loops in the mechanisms, k should keep increasing (and stop before a set
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value) in order to represent outputs of different length and Algorithm 1 should be applied on each
k at the same time. We supply more details of our implementation in the following section.
6 PUFFERFISH PRIVACY VERIFIER: FAIER
We implement our verification tool and present experimental results in Subsection 6.1. For the well-
known differential privacy mechanisms Noisy Max and Above Threshold, we provide modeling
details in HMMs and verify the privacy wrt. several classical Pufferfish privacy scenarios in
Subsection 6.2 and 6.3, accordingly.
6.1 Evaluation for FAIER
We implement our verification algorithm (Algorithm 1) into the tool FAIER, which is the pufferFish
privAcy verifIER. It is implemented both in C++ and Python environment and we performed all
experiments on a Intel® Core i7-8750H @ 2.20GHz CPU machine with 4 GB memory and 8 cores
in the virtual machine. All the examples in this paper have been verified by FAIER.
The inputs for our tool include an HMM H of the mechanism to be verified, distributions pair
(π ,τ ) on states in H for the databases distribution, and a non-negative real number c indicating the
privacy budget. Note that distributions can be represented as SMT formulae, so that people can find
out whether there exist π and τ under certain constraints which violate privacy conditions. There’s
also an input k in Algorithm 1 which specifies the length of observation sequence to compare.
Table 2. Experiment results: ✓indicates the property holds, and ✗not.
Mechanism Privacy scenario ResultQuery answer Counterexample
Truncated
1
2 -geometric
Mechanism
ln(2)-differential
privacy (Ex. 4.2) ✓
ln(2)-pufferfish
privacy (Ex. 4.3) ✗ 2˜
ln(2)-pufferfish
privacy (Ex. 4.4) ✗ 0˜
ln(2)-pufferfish
privacy (Ex. 4.5) ✓
Naive Discrete Noisy
Max (Algorithm 2)
ln(2)-differential
privacy (Ex. 6.1) ✗ ⊥, 0˜
Improved Discrete
Noisy Max
(Algorithm 3)
ln(2)-pufferfish
privacy (Ex. 6.2) ✓
ln(2)-pufferfish
privacy (Ex. 6.3) ✗ ⊥, 3˜; pA = pB = pC =
1
2
Above Threshold
Algorithm
(Algorithm 4)
4 ln(2)-differential
privacy ✗ ⌞⌟, 01,⊥, 12,⊥, 12,⊥,12,⊥,21,⊤
We summarize the experiment results in this paper for pufferfish privacy, as well as differential
privacy in Table 2. We have three differential privacy scenarios, and five pufferfish privacy scenarios.
FAIER has the following outputs:
• Counterexample: If the privacy condition does not hold (marked by ✗), FAIER will return a
witnessing observation sequence, i.e. the counterexample, leading to the violation.
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• Parameter Synthesis: If there exist unknown parameters in the model, such as one infected
with some disease of probability p, a value will be synthesized for the corresponding coun-
terexample. See Ex. 6.3 where counterexample is found when pA,pB ,pC are instantiated to 12 ;
Or, no value can be found if the privacy is always preserved. See Ex. 6.2.
• ✓ is returned if the privacy is preserved.
Note if there exists a loop in the model, the bound k should continue to increase. The bound is set
at a maximum of 11 for the mechanisms in the paper. It may happen that FAIER does not terminate
since some nonlinear constraints are too complex for the SMT solver Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner
2008], such as Ex. 6.2. We set a timeout value of 20 minutes and if the constraints can’t be solved,
we encode them into a more powerful tool REDLOG for nonlinear constraints [Dolzmann and
Sturm 1997] and solve the problem.
Among the mechanisms in Table 2, Algorithm 2,3,4 need our further investigation. We examine
these algorithms carefully in the following subsections.
6.2 Noisy Max
Noisy Max (or Report Noisy Max [Dwork and Roth 2014]) is a simple yet useful data publishing
mechanism in differential privacy [Ding et al. 2018; Dwork and Roth 2014]. Consider n queries of
the same range, say, the number of patients for n different diseases in a hospital. We are interested
in knowing which of the n diseases has the maximal number of patients in the hospital. A simple
privacy-respecting way to release the information is to add independent noises to every query
result and then return the index of the maximal noisy results.
6.2.1 Naive Discrete Noisy Max in Differential Privacy. In [Dwork and Roth 2014], Noisy Max algo-
rithm adds continuous Laplacian noises to each query result and returns the index of the maximal
noisy query result. The continuous Noisy Max algorithm is proved to effectively protect privacy for
neighboring data sets [Ding et al. 2018]. Continuous noises however are replaced by discrete noises
using floating-point numbers in practice. Technically, the distribution of discrete floating-point
noises is different. The proof for continuous Noisy Max algorithm does not immediately apply.
Indeed, care must be taken to avoid privacy breach [Mironov 2012].
Algorithm 2 Naive Discrete Noisy Max
Require: 0 ≤ v1,v2, . . . ,vn ≤ 2
Ensure: The maximal vr among v1,v2, . . . ,vn
1: function NoisyMax(v1,v2, . . . ,vn )
2: M, r ← −1, 0
3: for each vi do
4: match vi with ▷ apply 12 -geometric mechanism
5: case 0: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 23 , 16 , 16
6: case 1: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 13 , 13 , 13
7: case 2: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 16 , 16 , 23
8: if M < v˜i then
9: M, r ← v˜i , i
10: end if
11: end for
12: return r
13: end function
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· · · 011
⌞⌟
· · · 120
⌞⌟
· · · 202
⌞⌟
· · ·
· · · 022
2˜ (Algorithm 2)
2˜( 12 ), 3˜( 12 ) (Algorithm 3)
· · ·
23 · 13 · 13
13 ·
23 ·
16 1
6
·1 6
·2 3
Fig. 2. Hidden Markov Model for Noisy Max
We modify the standard algorithm by adding discrete noises to discrete query results (Algo-
rithm 2). In the algorithm, the variables M and r contain the maximal noisy result and its index
respectively. We apply the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism to each query with the discrete range{0, 1, 2}. For each query result vi , the algorithm first computes a noisy result v˜i for vi using the
geometric mechanism. The noisy result v˜i is then compared with the maximal noisy resultM . IfM
is less than the current noisy result, the maximal noisy result and index are updated. The discrete
Noisy Max algorithm (Algorithm 2) adds discrete noises to discrete queries. We formally analyze it
in the following example.
Example 6.1. Fig. 2 gives an HMM for the discrete Noisy Max algorithm with n = 3 queries.
Each top state models query results v1, v2 and v3. For instance, the node labeled 011 represents
(v1,v2,v3) = (0, 1, 1). The noisy query results are the labels of nodes at the bottom. Hence the
node labeled 022 represents the noisy query result (v˜1, v˜2, v˜3) = (0, 2, 2). The underlined query
results denote the maximal noisy value. Arrows again denote probabilistic transitions. Hence the
probability of moving to (v˜1, v˜2, v˜3) = (0, 2, 2) from (v1,v2,v3) = (0, 1, 1) is 23 · 13 · 13 by the truncated
1
2 -geometric mechanism. {⌞⌟, 1˜, 2˜, 3˜} is the set of observations. All top nodes only observe ⌞⌟ with
probability 1. In the figure, the noisy query results 2 and 3 are maximal at the node labeled 022. By
Algorithm 2, the index of the first maximal noisy query result is return. Hence 2˜ is observed.
At the first glance, the naïve discretization does not appear harmful. Interestingly, our tool shows
that the naïve discretization is not ln(2)-differentially private, with a ratio of probabilities observing
the counterexample ⌞⌟0˜ larger than 2 on a pair of neighboring states. ■
It is not hard to see why the naïve discretized algorithm does not work in hindsight. When there
are multiple noisy query results with the maximal value, Algorithm 2 always returns the first index.
For continuous noises, the probability of having multiple noisy query results with the same value
is 0. The continuous Noisy Max algorithm hence returns the index of the maximal noisy query
result without privacy risks. For discrete noises, several noisy query results can have the same
value. Disregarding the possibility can induce significant privacy risks. One cannot be too careful
to discretize privacy mechanisms.
6.2.2 Improved Discrete Noisy Max in Differential Privacy. A simple way to address the privacy
breach in the naïve discretized Noisy Max algorithm is to return indices of noisy query results with
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the maximal value uniformly. This can be done by introducing a counter c to record the number of
indices with the maximal noisy value. If the current noisy query result is greater than the maximal
noisy value, the index r is updated with probability 1c after the counter c is incremented. Algorithm 3
explicitly returns indices of queries with the maximal noisy value of an equal probability.
Algorithm 3 Improved Discrete Noisy Max
Require: 0 ≤ v1,v2, . . . ,vn ≤ 2
Ensure: The index r with the maximal vr among v1,v2, . . . ,vn
1: function DiscreteNoisyMax(v1,v2, . . . ,vn )
2: M, r , c ← −1, 0, 0
3: for each vi do
4: match vi with ▷ apply 12 -geometric mechanism
5: case 0: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 23 , 16 , 16
6: case 1: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 13 , 13 , 13
7: case 2: v˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 16 , 16 , 23
8: if M = v˜i then
9: c ← c + 1
10: r ← i with probability 1c
11: end if
12: if M < v˜i then
13: M, r , c ← v˜i , i, 1
14: end if
15: end for
16: return r
17: end function
The HMM for Algorithm 3 is almost identical to the model for Algorithm 2 except for the
observation distributions of the bottom nodes. For each bottom node, the noisy index 1˜, 2˜ or 3˜ is
observed depending on the number of noisy query results with the maximal value. For instance, 2˜
or 3˜ is observed at the node labeled 022 with probability 12 in Fig. 2.
Using our tool, Algorithm 3 still doesn’t satisfy ln(2)-differentially private. However, we test a
few values of ϵ , to find out that the differential privacy budget ϵ for Algorithm 3 is 1.3, smaller than
that for Algorithm 2, which is 2.1. We can say Algorithm 3 is an improvement of Algorithm 2, but
still with a privacy budget larger than ln(2). Thus it is not sufficient to replace continuous noises
with discrete noises. Additional steps are required to preserve privacy and the privacy guarantee
should be examined carefully. An inexperienced mechanism designer may naïvely discretize the
standard Noisy Max algorithm and put privacy at risk. Next we analyze Algorithm 3 under the
Pufferfish framework.
6.2.3 Improved Discrete Noisy Max in Pufferfish Privacy.
Example 6.2. Consider three counting queries fA, fB , and fC for the number of individuals con-
tracting the diseasesA,B, andC respectively in the data setX2 withX = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), . . . ,(1,1,1)}.
An element (a,b, c) ∈ X denotes whether the data entry contracts the diseases A, B, and C re-
spectively. Assume that the contraction of each disease is independent among individuals and
the probabilities of contracting the diseases A, B, and C are pA, pB , and pC respectively. The prior
knowledge induces an information state for the model in Fig. 2. For example, the state 120 has the
probability 2pA(1 − pA) · p2B · (1 − pC )2.
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Suppose John is in the data set and whether John contracts the disease A is a secret. We would
like to check if the discrete Noisy Max algorithm can protect the secret using the Pufferfish privacy
framework. Let us compute the initial information state π given that John has not contracted
disease A. For instance, the initial probability of the state 120 is 2pA(1−pA)(1−pA)2+2pA(1−pA) · p2B · (1 − pC )2.
The initial information state π is obtained by computing the probabilities of each of the 33 top
states. Given that John has the disease A, the initial information state τ is computed similarly. In
this case, the initial probability of the state 120 becomes 2pA(1−pA)2pA(1−pA)+p2A · p
2
B · (1 − pC )2. Probabilities
of the 33 top states form the initial information state τ . From the initial information state π and
τ , we compute the probabilities of observing ⌞⌟1˜, ⌞⌟2˜, and ⌞⌟3˜ in the formal model (Fig. 2). The
formulae for observation probabilities are easy to compute. However, the SMT solver Z3 cannot
solve the non-linear formulae generated by our algorithm. In order to establish Pufferfish privacy
automatically, we submit the non-linear formulae to the constraint solver REDLOG. This time, the
solver successfully proves the HMM satisfying ln(2)-Pufferfish privacy. ■
Algorithm 3 is ln(2)-Pufferfish private when the contraction of diseases is independent for data
entries. Our next step is to analyze the privacy mechanism model when the contraction of the
disease A is correlated among data entries.
Example 6.3. Assume that the data set consists of two family members, including John, and the
disease A is highly contagious. Suppose John has not contracted the disease A. We compute the
initial information state π using pA, pB , and pC with the prior knowledge. For instance, the initial
probabilities for states 011 and 202 are (1−pA) ·2pB (1−pB ) ·2pC (1−pC ) and 0 respectively. Similarly,
we obtain the initial information state τ given that John has the disease. The initial probabilities
for 011 and 202 are 0 and pA · (1 − pB )2 · p2C respectively. Our tool finds the discrete Noisy Max
algorithm is no longer ln(2)-Pufferfish private when pA = pB = pC = 12 . ■
Designing privacy protection mechanisms can be tricky. Provably correct mechanisms can leak
private information by seemingly harmless modification. Ideally, privacy guarantees of modified
mechanisms need be re-established. Detailed proofs for privacy analysis sometimes are missing or
overlooked in practice. Our verification tool can reveal ill-designed privacy protection mechanisms
easily. In Algorithm 3, we have considered multiple queries with the same maximal noisy value. If
more than one query have the same maximal noisy value, one of their indices is reported uniformly
randomly. A naïve adoption of the standard Noisy Max algorithm only simply returns an index
deterministically. It would not have the same privacy guarantee.
6.3 Above Threshold
Above threshold is a classical differentially private mechanism for releasing numerical informa-
tion [Dwork and Roth 2014]. Consider a data set and an infinite sequence of counting queries
f1, f2, . . .. We would like to know the index of the first counting query whose result is above a
given threshold. In order to protect privacy, the classical algorithm adds continuous noises on the
threshold and each query results. If the noisy query result is less than the noisy threshold, the
algorithm reports ⊥ and continues to the next counting query. Otherwise, the algorithm reports ⊤
and stops.
6.3.1 Algorithm and Model. We consider counting queries with range {0, 1, 2} and apply the
truncated geometric mechanism for discrete noises. The discretized above threshold algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 4. The algorithm first obtains the noisy threshold t˜ using the truncated
1
4 -geometric mechanism. For each query result ri , it computes a noisy result r˜i by applying the
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Algorithm 4 Input: private database d, counting queries fi : d→ {0, 1, 2}, threshold t ∈ {0, 1, 2};
Output: a1,a2, . . .
1: procedure AboveThreshold(d, { f1, f2, . . .}, t )
2: match t with ▷ apply 14 -geometric mechanism
3: case 0: t˜ ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 45 , 320 , 120
4: case 1: t˜ ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 15 , 35 , 15
5: case 2: t˜ ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 120 , 320 , 45
6: for each query fi do
7: ri ← fi (d)
8: match ri with ▷ apply 12 -geometric mechanism
9: case 0: r˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 23 , 16 , 16
10: case 1: r˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 13 , 13 , 13
11: case 2: r˜i ← 0, 1, 2 with probability 16 , 16 , 23
12: if r˜i ≥ t˜ then halt with ai = ⊤ else ai = ⊥
13: end for
14: end procedure
truncated 12 -geometric mechanism. If r˜i < t˜ , the algorithm outputs ⊥ and continues. Otherwise, it
halts with the output ⊤.
To ensure ϵ-differential privacy, the classical algorithm applies the 2ϵ - and
4
ϵ -Laplace mechanism
to the threshold and each query result respectively. The continuous noisy threshold and query
results are hence ϵ2 - and
ϵ
4 -differentially private. In Algorithm 4, the discrete noisy threshold and
query results are 2 ln(2)- and ln(2)-differentially private. If the classical proof still applies, we expect
the discrete above threshold algorithm is 4 ln(2)-differentially private for ϵ2 = 2 ln(2).
Fig. 3 gives an HMM for Algorithm 4. In the model, the state tir j represents the input threshold
t = i and the first query result r = f1(d) = j for an input data set d. From the state tir j , we apply
the truncated 14 -geometric mechanism. The state t˜ir j hence means the noisy threshold t˜ = i with
the query result r = j . For instance, the state t0r1 transits to t˜1r1 with probability 320 . After the noisy
threshold is obtained, we compute a noisy query result by the truncated 12 -geometric mechanism.
The state t˜i r˜ j represents the noisy threshold t˜ = i and the noisy query result r˜ = j. In the figure,
we see that the state t˜1r0 moves to t˜1r˜0 with probability 23 . At the state t˜i r˜ j , ⊤ is observed if j ≥ i;
otherwise, ⊥ is observed. From the state t˜i r˜ j , the model transits to the states t˜ir0, t˜ir1, t˜ir2 with
uniform distribution. This simulates the next query result in Algorithm 4. The model then continues
to process the next query.
The bottom half of Fig. 3 is another copy of the model. All states in the second copy are underlined.
For instance, the state t˜2r 0 represents the noisy threshold is 2 and the query result is 0. Given
an observation sequence, the two copies are used to simulate the mechanism conditioned on the
prior knowledge with the two secrets in a secret pair. For the figure, we define the observation
set Ω = {⌞⌟,⊥,⊤, 00, 01, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22,♠, ♥, ♦, ♣}. At the initial states tir j and t ir j , only ⌞⌟ can
be observed. When the noisy threshold is greater than the noisy query result (t˜i r˜ j and t˜ i r˜ j with
i > j), ⊥ is observed. On the other hand, ⊤ is observed at states t˜i r˜ j and t˜ i r˜ j with i ≤ j. Other
observations are used to “synchronize” query results in the two copies explained below.
Recall that the states t˜ir j represent the current query result is j for the top copy. For counting
queries on neighboring data sets, the query result in the bottom copy can differ from j by at most 1.
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Fig. 3. Hidden Markov Model for Above Threshold
That is, when the top copy is at the state t˜ir j , the bottom copy can only be at the states t˜kr l with
|j − l | ≤ 1. Particularly, the top state t˜1r2 forbids the bottom state t˜1r 0. We use the observation jl to
denote the top query result is j at t˜ir j and the bottom query result is l at t˜kr l . For instance, 01 is
observed at the states t˜1r0 and t˜2r 1. The four unique symbols ♠, ♥, ♦, ♣make the sum of observation
probabilities equal to 1 in related states. Besides, ♠, ♥ only show in the top half and ♦, ♣ only show
in the bottom half to ensure that no common observations involving these symbols can be obtained
from these two halves. For any observation sequence j1l1 j2l2 · · · jw lw , the top copy simulates the
above threshold mechanism with query results j1, j2, . . . , jw and the bottom copy simulates the
mechanism with query results l1, l2, . . . , lw such that |jn − ln | ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ n ≤ w . Note that 02
and 20 are not observations since the difference of results for a same query on neighboring data
sets can’t be more than 1. The modeling process is further explained in the Appendix. Note that if
we use a Markov chain to model this algorithm, the number of states will immediately explode
from 6n to 10n, where n is the number of states in a row in Fig. 3, due to the multiple observations
in one state and the transition probabilities follow to change and explode in numbers accordingly.
6.3.2 Differential Privacy Analysis. We can now perform differential privacy analysis using the
HMM in Fig. 3. By construction, each observation corresponds to a sequence of queries on neigh-
boring data sets and their results. If the proof of continuous above threshold mechanism could
carry over to our discretized mechanism, we would expect differences of observation probabilities
from neighboring data sets to be bounded by the multiplicative factor of e4 ln(2) = 16. Surprisingly,
our tool always reports larger differences when the number of queries increases. After generalizing
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finite observations found by an SMT solver, we obtain an observation sequence of an arbitrary
length described below.
Fix n > 0. Consider a data set d such that fi (d) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and fn+1(d) = 2. A neighbor d′ of
dmay have fi (d′) = 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and fn+1(d′) = 1. Note that | fi (d) − fi (d′)| ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
fi ’s are counting queries. Suppose the threshold t = 2. Let us compute the probabilities of observing
⊥n⊤ on d and d′.
If t˜ = 0, f˜1 ≥ t˜ . The algorithm reports⊤ and stops. We cannot observe⊥n⊤: recall the assumption
that n > 0. It suffices to consider t˜ = 1 or 2. When t˜ = 1, f˜i (d) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and f˜n+1(d) ≥ 1.
Recall fi (d) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and fn+1(d) = 2. The probability of observing ⊥n⊤ is ( 13 )n · 56 . When
t˜ = 2, f˜1(d) ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and f˜n+1(d) = 2. The probability of observing ⊥n⊤ is thus ( 23 )n · 23 . In
summary, the probability of observing ⊥n⊤ with d when t = 2 is 320 · ( 13 )n · 56 + 45 · ( 23 )n · 23 . The
case for d
′
is similar. When t˜ = 1, the probability of observing ⊥n⊤ is ( 16 )n · 23 . When t˜ = 2, the
probability of observing the same sequence is ( 13 )n · 13 . Hence the probability of observing ⊥n⊤
with d
′
when t = 2 is 320 · ( 16 )n · 23 + 45 · ( 13 )n · 13 .
Now,
Pr(ω = ⊥n⊤|d, t = 2)
Pr(ω = ⊥n⊤|d′, t = 2)
=
3
20 · ( 13 )n · 56 + 45 · ( 23 )n · 23
3
20 · ( 16 )n · 23 + 45 · ( 13 )n · 13
>
4
5 · ( 23 )n · 23
3
20 · ( 13 )n · 23 + 45 · ( 13 )n · 13
=
8
15 ( 23 )n
11
30 ( 13 )n
=
16
11 · 2
n .
We see that the ratio of Pr(ω = ⊥n⊤|d, t = 2) and Pr(ω = ⊥n⊤|d′, t = 2) can be arbitrarily large.
Unexpectedly, the discrete above threshold cannot be ϵ-differentially private for any ϵ . Replacing
continuous noises with truncated discrete noises does not preserve any privacy at all. This case
emphasizes the importance of applying verification technique to various implementations.
7 COMBINING VERIFICATION AND TESTING
In this section, we investigate into a practical well-built testing tool StatDP [Ding et al. 2018], for
identifying counterexamples for differential privacy based on testing techniques. In order to compare
with our tool FAIER, the discrete algorithms, including Noisy Max and Above Threshold, are
implemented in the tool. We present comparisons in Subsection 7.2, and moreover, in Subsection 7.3,
we discuss how testing and our verification technique can be combined to certify counterexamples
and find lower bound for privacy budget.
7.1 Evaluation for StatDP
StatDP adopts hypothesis testing to determine whether an algorithm satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
It has successfully found counterexamples of incorrect variants of continuous mechanisms including
Noisy Max and Above Threshold algorithm (Sparse Vector Technology in their paper). The difference
of our tool and theirs lies in that we use modeling and verification to examine the entire state
space and compute probabilities, while they confine search space of databases and events and
use sampling and testing to determine probabilities. As far as we know, StatDP cannot deal with
Pufferfish privacy problems for the reason that unknown parameters in the prior knowledge may
cause uncertainty to database distributions, which makes it hard to sample and test.
The testing tool works and is interpreted as follows: run hypothesis testing for a set of values of
privacy budget ϵ and compute the corresponding p-value of the mechanism. The p-value represents
the confidence to reject the null hypothesis. Specifically, if the p-value is small (less than 0.05)
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for some ϵ0, it rejects the hypothesis, which indicates that the mechanism violates ϵ0-differential
privacy; otherwise if the p-value is very close to 1, the mechanism is more “likely” to satisfy
ϵ0-differential privacy. Fig. 4a is for the naive noisy-max algorithm which returns the first index of
the maximal perturbed results (Algorithm 2). The p-value sticks to 0 whenever ϵ increases, which
means that the algorithm does not satisfy ϵ-differential privacy for ϵ in [0,2] and is consistent with
our analysis. Note that a value of ϵ whose p-value close to 1 indicates the true privacy budget.
Fig. 4b is the testing result for the adapted noisy-max algorithm which returns the index of maximal
value with equal probabilities if there are multiple ones (Algorithm 3). This time, the p-value rises
to 1 when ϵ is 1.6, which implicitly implies this algorithm satisfy 1.6-differential privacy.
7.2 Comparison
7.2.1 Efficiency and Precision. We make comparison of StatDP with our tool FAIER in terms of
efficiency and precision by examining the experiment results on mechanisms in differential privacy.
As for the efficiency, it is clear that testing will take less running time than verification approach
along with the growth of databases for the reason that one only needs to search in a confined
space while the other needs to explore the entire state space. Our tool has limitations that we may
encounter the problem of space explosion if the size of databases are too long, which is a common
problem in model verification. Then it may take much time to build the corresponding models
and solve the SMT queries, whose amount is especially huge in differential privacy generated by
neighboring pairs. In terms of time, the running time StatDP takes is mainly related to the iteration
times for selecting events and detecting counterexamples and the size of input databases. Following
usual setting of 50000 times for event selections, 200000 times for counterexample detections and
input databases of length 3 − 10, the average running time for each ϵ of mechanisms, that is, each
dot in the graph, is 15− 25 seconds. Meanwhile, the running time of our tool FAIER mainly depends
on the size of databases and the length k of observation sequence. Since larger databases generate
much more neighboring pairs in differential privacy and larger k results in more complex SMT
query. When the size of databases are in length 3 − 5 and k is less than 12, our tool returns a query
answer for each neighboring pair less than 1 second. FAIER does not scale with length: for length
larger than 5, FAIER does not terminate due to TIMEOUT (20 minutes).
Nevertheless, as for the precision for the privacy budget ϵ , our tool outperforms StatDP. On
the one hand, testing cannot offer precise results as indicated by the authors of StatDP: “a typical
feature of hypothesis tests as it becomes difficult to reject the null hypothesis when it is only slightly
incorrect” [Ding et al. 2018]. We illustrate this problem in Fig. 4e, which shows three testing results
for Algorithm 3 with the same settings. The dashed vertical line is the ϵ0 obtained by our tool. It’s
clear to see that the p-value for a given value ϵ can differ in a large interval. More importantly, in
hypothesis testing neither can we reject a mechanism as ϵ-differential privacy if the corresponding
p-value is above 0.05 nor accept a mechanism as ϵ-differential privacy if the p-value is not “close”
to 1, which brings huge uncertainty for ϵ with p-value in (0.05,1). Therefore, for ϵ with p-value in
(0.05,1), hypothesis testing can’t give right conclusion of ϵ-differential privacy or not with high
confidence. However, our tool can exactly determine ϵ-differential privacy for an algorithm.
7.2.2 StatDP fails to find Counterexamples. On the other hand, we address another situation by
running the tools on discrete Above Threshold algorithm (Algorithm 4). As we have proved in
Section 6.3, the discrete Above Threshold algorithm does not satisfy ϵ-differential privacy for
any value of ϵ . Our tool keeps reporting counterexample with longer length k of observation
sequence along with the increase of ϵ . However, when we implement the algorithm in StatDP, the
tool surprisingly shows that there exists an ϵ such as 3 that the algorithm satisfies 3-differential
privacy (Fig. 4c), which contradicts our proof. At our first thought, the testing approach might
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(a) Testing for Algorithm 2 (b) Testing for Algorithm 3
(c) Testing for Algorithm 4 with databases of
lengths 2-3
(d) Testing for Algorithm 4 with databases of
lengths 10-15
(e) Apply the same testing for Algorithm 3 3 times (f) Testing for Algorithm 3 to find the interval I
Fig. 4. Evaluation for StatDP
fail to find the best candidate event that could show the differential privacy is violated. So we
find a counterexample with ϵ = 3 produced by our tool, which has an observation sequence of
⌞⌟, 01,⊥, 12,⊥, 12,⊥, 12,⊥, 01,⊤, corresponding to ⊥4⊤, and feed it back to StatDP, expecting that
the tool could generate a privacy violation result on this counterexample. However, the tool shows
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that the event, that is, the counterexample, can never be generated. We make a careful examination
of their source code and perform more testings, finally to find that it happens because the number
of queries to test, are bounded by the length of the input databases. Specifically, in the Algorithm 4,
the number of queries are not specified and can be independent of the length of databases. However,
we need to specify the length of databases in StatDP and when we set 3 to the length of databases,
the number of queries is 3 at most and therefore it can never generate an event like ⊥4⊤ with 5
queries. In order to make it clearer, we set the length of databases differently and get the results in
the Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d.
It is clear to see that the privacy budgets differ a lot in two settings of different lengths of
databases in that when the lengths of input are longer, the testing approach assumes that the
privacy budget is larger for the reason that the examined event space is larger. Though, the results
of testing are incorrect in the sense that Algorithm 4 should never satisfy ϵ-differential privacy
for any value of ϵ . And those graphs of p-value may mislead data curators into believing that the
mechanism preserves some value of differential privacy while it is actually not. Their results hold
in the condition of databases in a certain length and queries with a certain amount. In comparison,
our tool can model infinite number of queries achieved by the loops in Fig. 3, with the parameter k
standing for the amount of posed queries. Therefore, in terms of precision, we observe from this
example that StatDP might draw wrong conclusions while FAIER is more precise.
7.3 Combining FAIER and StatDP
The findings during experiments of our tool FAIER and StatDP inspire us to combine verification
and testing together to get efficient and precise results.
7.3.1 Counterexample Certification. The process in Section 7.2 also shows a certification process
for counterexample analysis. Recall that we first generate a counterexample in our tool, specify it
as the distinguished event in the testing tool, testing reports that no such counterexample exists,
we finally realize to increase databases length and do more testings. Since the counterexample
found by FAIER is correct and precise, this process helps us locate the problem. Moreover, we
are able to do that in a reverse mode to verify the counterexample of testing since testing cannot
get too precise results, which has been partially explained in the previous section. To be specific,
testing returns a p-value for each ϵ , along with an event that generates this smallest p-value.
If the p-value is less than 0.05, then the event can be regarded as an efficient counterexample
under which ϵ-differential privacy is violated. However, everything becomes uncertain when the
p-value is in the interval of (0.05, 1). The events delivered by testing in this situation cannot be
classified: they can be either real or spurious counterexamples. Fortunately, our tool can solve the
problem in a way that we encode those events into observation sequences and distributions, in
order to compute the probabilities for the observation sequences and check whether the condition
of ϵ-differential privacy is satisfied. Take Fig. 4e as an example. The left part of the vertical dashed
lines corresponds to all the real counterexamples while the right part corresponds to the spurious
counterexamples. In all the cases, only one counterexample can be confirmed by testing (the one
with p-value below 0.05). Instead, our tool can effectively check whether all events given by testing
are real counterexamples or spurious ones. Moreover, if the p-value is 1 for an ϵ , i.e. with high
confidence of mechanism satisfying ϵ-differential privacy, our tool FAIER can check if there is a
counterexample for the given ϵ and further verify the mechanism.
7.3.2 A Better Lower Bound. We follow the definition of lower bound for privacy budget in the
paper [Bichsel et al. 2018]: the largest ϵ that an randomized algorithm is not ϵ-differential privacy.
It’s important to infer and synthesize the lower bounds in order to show the tightness of existing
upper bounds or even identify incorrect upper bounds. But sometimes the lower bound generated
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by testing is rather coarse and may be far away from the upper bound. However, combining testing
approach and our verification technique, we are able to generate an ϵ which can be arbitrarily close
to the true lower bound of the mechanism. The pseudo-code is in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Pseudo-code to compute the lower bound
1: procedure Compute the lower bound(Mechanism M)
2: Use StatDP with input M to get a lower bound interval I ▷ the left end point of I can be an ϵ
with p-value< 0.05 and the right end point can be an ϵ with p-value= 1
3: Apply binary search on I, in each iteration the value is ϵ
4: repeat
5: Use FAIER with input M and ϵ
6: if result is SAT then ▷ not satisfy ϵ-differential privacy
7: left end point = ϵ
8: else ▷ satisfy ϵ-differential privacy
9: right end point = ϵ
10: end if
11: until reaching required precision
12: end procedure
Algorithm 5 first uses the mechanism M as the input to the testing tool StatDP, to obtain an
interval I whose left end point is ϵ with p-value< 0.05 and the right end point is with p-value= 1.
As we mentioned before, the p-value just stands for certain probability to reject the null testing
hypothesis. Testing can tell us with p-value< 0.05, the mechanism doesn’t satisfy corresponding
ϵ-differential privacy with high confidence and with p-value= 1, the mechanism satisfies with high
confidence. However, for the p-values in (0.05,1), testing is not able to give useful conclusions. This
is where our tool can work out. With the help of binary search in the interval, FAIER can determine
whether M satisfies ϵ-differential privacy, given an ϵ in the interval. Thus we can get arbitrarily
close to the lower bound for ϵ wrt. a given precision. For instance, we apply StatDP on Algorithm 3
and the p-value graph of the mechanism is in Figure 4f. Then we choose interval I = [1.21, 1.28]
and apply our tool FAIER with binary search to verify ϵ-differential privacy. Consequently, our
tool reports that the lower privacy budget bound is 1.232 (accurate to three decimal places), which
means M doesn’t satisfy 1.232-differential privacy while it satisfies 1.233-differential privacy. This
is a witnessing example where testing first roughly examines the bound for the privacy budget and
then verification precisely verifies the values in the bound. Finally the two approaches collaborate
together to produce a much more precise and better lower bound.
8 RELATEDWORK
The definition of Pufferfish privacy allows correlations among data items [Kifer and Machanava-
jjhala 2014], which is an elegant generalization of differential privacy [Dwork 2006]. Since then
many follow-up works have explored the topic. Song et al. [Song et al. 2017] provided the first
efficient mechanism to apply Pufferfish Privacy, which is the generalization of continuous Laplace
mechanism for differential privacy. Niu et al. [Niu et al. 2019] provided new insights on trading
private date with correlations in Pufferfish privacy framework where data owners can be compen-
sated for their privacy loss. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first one that could
automatically verify discrete Pufferfish privacy mechanisms. There is a body of work to prove
correctness of differential privacy algorithms. Barthe et al. [Barthe et al. 2012a,b] extended the
probabilistic relational Hoare logic, which enables one to derive differential privacy guarantees for
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programs. With the help of proof assistant Coq, they successfully proved the differential privacy
for several classic algorithms, including Above Threshold and Noisy Max algorithm. The authors
later [Barthe et al. 2016a,b] applyed approximate probabilistic couplings between programs on
adjacent inputs in order to get the quantitative relations of outputs, which caters to the definition
of differential privacy. Using this method, they again successfully proved several classic algo-
rithms in differential privacy. However, like the process of finding proofs in theorem proving, the
construction of the proof was very challenging and took much effort of professionals, and their
methods cannot be used to disprove privacy. Albarghouthi et al. [Albarghouthi and Hsu 2017]
introduced automated coupling strategies into the above technique and successfully made the
process of building proofs much easier. Though, this method can only deal with limited patterns of
differential privacy mechanisms. Liu et al. [Liu et al. 2018] proposed a method to verify differential
privacy using model checking. They modeled differential privacy algorithms into Markov chains
and Markov decision progresses and extended probabilistic temporal logic to describe privacy
properties. Compared to our method, every output event in their models needs to be specified in
the logic language in order to invoke the model checker, where the formula can be of infinite length
with infinite conjunctions, and the framework does not support parameterized algorithms. In terms
of computation complexity for (continuous) differential privacy mechanisms, recently, Gaboardi
et al. [Gaboardi et al. 2020] studied the problem of verifying differential privacy for loop-free
programs with probabilistic choice. They showed that to decide whether a such program satisfies
ϵ-differential privacy is coNP#P-complete and the problem of approximating the level of differential
privacy is both NP-hard and coNP-hard. Barthe et al. [Barthe et al. 2020] first proved that checking
differential privacy is undecidable even if one restricted to programs having a single Boolean input
and a single Boolean output. Thus they defined a non-trivial class of programs and used discrete
time Markov chains to model and reduce the verification procedure into a decidable fragment of
the first-order theory of the reals. Currently, their implementation sets many restrictions to the
variables and only allows loop-free programs. Recently, testing approaches have been investigated.
Bichsel et.al [Bichsel et al. 2018] proposed a method combining sampling and searching, to find
a lower bound epsilon of differential privacy algorithm, which is the largest ϵ that a randomized
algorithm is not ϵ-DP. A lower bound is useful to show the tightness of an existing upper bound or
identify an incorrect upper bound. It limits the exact privacy bound enforced by an randomized
algorithm, which is, however, hard to prove. Ding et.al [Ding et al. 2018] proposed to use stochastic
testing to verify algorithms in differential privacy: the discretized version has been compared in
details with our algorithm in the paper.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed an automatic verification technique for discretized Pufferfish
privacy. We use HMMs to model the Pufferfish privacy mechanisms and analyze Pufferfish privacy
using SMT solvers. A complexity lower bound for the Pufferfish privacy problem is shown to be NP-
hard. Nevertheless, the tool FAIER based on our automatic technique has analyzed several discretized
privacy mechanisms such as the truncated geometric mechanism, Noisy Max and Above Threshold
mechanism in the Pufferfish privacy framework. Our analysis shows that naïve discretization can
result in privacy loss. In the worst case, the discretized Above Threshold mechanism does not
have any privacy guarantee at all. We give a thorough comparison with the practical testing tool
for differential privacy, and we propose to combine verification and testing for the purpose of
counterexample certification and lower bound analysis for the privacy budget.
For future works, we plan to optimize our approach to handle large case studies. Moreover, it is
interesting to investigate how the verified discretized Pufferfish privacy mechanisms relate to the
continuous mechanisms.
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10 APPENDIX
10.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2.
Proof. In order to satisfy Pufferfish privacy in hidden Markov model, we have to decide whether
expressions (4) and (5) are no more than 0. Let’s just simplify the problem by only having one
initial distribution pair to compare so that we only need to find the observation sequence. We will
show the problem to find the maximal value is NP-hard by a reduction from the classic Boolean
Satisfiability Problem (SAT), which is known to be NP-hard. To be specific, given an arbitrary
formula in conjuncted normal form, we construct a corresponding hidden Markov model under
Pufferfish privacy framework, such that the formula is satisfiable if and only if the expressions (4)
and (5) both take the maximal value 0.
Assume we have a formula F (x1, . . . ,xn) in conjuncted normal form, with n(n >= 3) variables
andm clauses,C1, . . . ,Cm . We shall construct a hidden Markov model H = (K ,Ω,o) such that with
ϵ = ln(4), expressions (4) and (5) will take maximal value 0 if and only if the formula F (x1, . . . ,xn)
is satisfiable.
Construction. The construction of model is similar to that in [Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis 1987].
We first describe the Markov Chain K = (S,p). S contains a state group A with six states Ai j , A′i j ,
TAij , T ′Aij , FAij , F
′
Aij and a state group B with six states Bi j , B
′
i j , TBi j , T ′Bi j , FBi j , F
′
Bi j for each clause
Ci and variable x j . Besides, there are 4m states Ai,n+1, A′i,n+1, Bi,n+1, B′i,n+1 for each clause Ci . The
transition distribution p is as follows. For group A, there are two transitions with same probability
1
2 leading from state Ai j to TAij and FAij respectively; similarly there are two transitions leading
with probability 12 from A
′
i j to T ′Aij and F
′
Aij . There’s only one transition leading with certainty
from TAij , FAij , T ′Aij , F
′
Aij , to Ai, j+1, Ai, j+1, A
′
i, j+1, A′i, j+1 respectively with two exceptions: If x j
appears positively in Ci , the transition from T ′Aij is to Ai, j+1 instead of A
′
i, j+1; and if x j appears
negatively, the transition from F ′Aij is to Ai, j+1. For the state group B, all the transitions imitate that
in group A only with different state names. For instance, there are two transitions leading with
same probability 12 from state Bi j to TBi j and FBi j and so on.
Next we describe the observations Ω and the observation distribution. In state Ai j , A′i j , Bi j , B′i j
with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, one can observe X j ∈ Ω with certainty. In state TAij , T ′Aij , TBi j , T ′Bi j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
one can only observe Tj ∈ Ω; similarly, the sole observation Fj ∈ Ω can be observed in state FAij ,
F ′Aij , FBi j , F
′
Bi j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In state Ai,n+1, we have probability 45 to observe ⊤ ∈ Ω and 15 to
observe ⊥ ∈ Ω; while in state Bi,n+1, we have probability 15 to observe ⊤ and 45 to observe ⊥. In
state A′i,n+1 and B′i,n+1, there are equal probabilities of
1
2 observing ⊤ and ⊥.
Fig. 5 illustrates a part of the construction for the CNF formula (x1 ∨¬x2) ∧ ¬x1. State names are
shown inside circles. Thin arrows represent transitions with probability 12 ; thick arrows represent
transitions with probability 1. Observation distributions are shown outside each states. For instance,
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T2
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F2
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⊤( 45 ),⊥( 15 )
Fig. 5. Construction for (x1 ∨ ¬x2) ∧ ¬x1
X1 is observed with probability 1 at the state A′11. At the state A′13, ⊤ and ⊥ are observed with
probability 12 each.
In the figure, the left-hand side corresponds to the clause x1 ∨ ¬x2. Since the variable x1 appears
positively in the clause, there is a transition from T ′A11 to A12 with probability 1 according to the
construction. Similarly, another transition from F ′A12 to A13 with probability 1 is needed for the
negative occurrence of the variable x2 in the clause. For the right-hand side corresponding to the
clause ¬x1, a transition from F ′A21 to A22 with probability 1 is added.
The construction for the state group B is almost identical except the observation distributions
on the states B13 and B23. At the states B13 and B23, ⊤ and ⊥ can be observed with probabilities 15
and 45 respectively. The construction for the state group B is not shown in the figure for brevity.
Then we describe the Pufferfish privacy scenario in this hidden Markov model. Assume that
according to prior knowledge D and discriminative secrets Spairs, we only have one initial distribu-
tion pair D1 and D2 to compare. D1 induces a uniform distribution, to start from each member in
the state set {A′i1} with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, whose probability is 1m . Similarly, in D2, the probability starting
from each member in the state set {B′i1} is also 1m with 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We set the parameter ϵ = ln(4).
Reduction. The intuition is that starting from state A′i1 or B′i1, the clause Ci is chosen and
then the assignment of each variable will be considered one by one in this clause. Once the
assignment of a variable x j makes Ci satisfied, immediately state Ai, j+1 or Bi, j+1 is reached. So
at last if state A′i,n+1 or B′i,n+1 is reached, it means that the clause Ci is not satisfied under this
assignment. Now, we claim that Pr(M(D1) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D2) = ω) takes the maximal value
0 if and only if ω is the observation sequence X1A1X2 . . .An⊤ such that formula F (x1, . . . ,xn) is
satisfied under assignment with Ai ∈ {Ti , Fi } for each variable xi (Similar analysis applies for
Pr(M(D2) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D1) = ω) except that it takes the maximal value 0 with ⊥ as the last
observation).
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We argue that 0 is the maximal value. It’s easy to see that if we take an arbitrary observation
sequenceω = X1A1X2 . . ., as long as⊤ or⊥ hasn’t been observed, Pr(M(D1) = ω)−4×Pr(M(D2) =
ω) < 0. That’s because the state group B just imitate the state group A before reaching the state
Bi,n+1 and B′i,n+1. Thus the maximal value must be less than 0 or be obtained after we observe ⊤ or
⊥.
Then we consider ω = X1A1X2 . . .An⊤. Note that if Ci is satisfied under observation ω, we start
from A′i1 and B′i1 both with probability
1
m , finally reaching Ai,n+1 and Bi,n+1 with probabilities
2−n× 1m × 45 and 2−n× 1m × 15 respectively; ifCi is not satisfied, we finally reachA′i,n+1 and B′i,n+1 with
equal probabilities of 2−n× 1m× 12 . Thus a satisfied clausewill contribute 2−n× 1m× 45−4×2−n× 1m× 15 = 0
to the result; while if some clause is not satisfied, Pr(M(D1) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D2) = ω) is strictly
less than 0. Therefore, if we choose a observation sequence ended with ⊤ such that all the clauses
are satisfied, Pr(M(D1) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D2) = ω) will take the maximal value 0. If we consider
ω = X1A1X2 . . .An⊥, similar analysis concludes that Pr(M(D1) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D2) = ω) will be
strictly less than 0. This indicates that 0 is the maximal value of Pr(M(D1) = ω)−4×Pr(M(D2) = ω)
among all the observation sequences.
Finally from the process above, it’s easy to see that Pr(M(D1) = ω) − 4 × Pr(M(D2) = ω)
takes the maximal value 0 if and only if F (x1, . . . ,xn) is satisfied under observation sequence
ω = X1A1X2 . . .An⊤with assignmentAi ∈ {Ti , Fi } for each variable xi . Since determining whether
Pufferfish privacy is preserved is equivalent to determining whether the maximal value is above 0,
we prove that the general problem for ϵ-Pufferfish privacy is NP-hard. □
10.2 Correctness of the Above Threshold Model
In the literature, if the perturbed query result is smaller than the perturbed threshold, noise will be
added into next query, the result of which is uncertain. Thus, nondeterminism is required here to
choose the next query and [Liu et al. 2018] uses a Markov decision process to model the algorithm.
In order to model nondeterminism in an HMM, we assign equal probabilities to return to all the
possible queries. For instance, from the state t˜1r˜0, the probabilities of going to states t˜1r˜0, t˜1r˜1 and
t˜1r˜2 are all 13 . Although this is slightly different from Algorithm 4, we will prove using this model
to avoid nondeterministic choices, whether Algorithm 4 satisfies ϵ−differential privacy can still be
verified. Before that, we first state the consistency of the outputs executed in the algorithm and the
observation sequences in the model.
Lemma 10.1. Assume that there are two neighboring databases, d1 and d2, along with queries fi
and threshold t given as input of Algorithm 4 and the output is An = a1a2...an = ⊥⊥...⊤ with n ≥ 1.
Then there is an initial distribution pair d1 and d2 and an one-to-one mapping observation sequence ok
such that ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d1) = Prm(on |d1) and ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d2) = Prm(on |d2), where Pra denotes
the probability of getting the outputs in Algorithm 4 and Prm denotes the probability of getting the
observation sequence in the hmm model in Fig. 3.
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of the outputAn = ⊥⊥...⊤with n symbols. Assume
the query results of neighboring databases d1 and d2 are i1, i2, ... and j1, j2, ..., with |ik − jk | <= 1
for any fixed k .
Base case: n = 1. If A1 = ⊤, the algorithm halts after comparing the first perturbed query with
the perturbed threshold. Naturally, there’s only one state ttri1 with probability 1 and the others with
probability 0 in the distributiond1, and only one state ttr j1 with probability 1 and the others with 0 in
d2. Starting from these initial distributions, we first observe a ⌞⌟ and then transit to the distribution
with states t˜t ′ri1 and t˜t ′r j1 having non-zero probabilities, where t ′ can be all possible values of
perturbed threshold. The only observation shared by theses states is i1j1, with observing probability
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1
3 . Then queries are then added by noise and we come to a new distribution of perturbed query
results and threshold t˜t ′r˜k ′ , where k ′ can be all possible values of perturbed query result. This time
we only choose states where perturbed query results are higher than the perturbed threshold and
all these states share an observation of ⊤ with observing probability 1. Thus, under the observation
sequence o1 = ⌞⌟, i1j1,⊤, we follow the steps of Algorithm 4 to make transitions in the model
and considering the observation probabilities, we can directly get 13 Pra(A1 |d1) = Prm(o1 |d1) and
1
3 Pra(A1 |d2) = Prm(o1 |d2). Note that ifA1 = ⊥, then under the observation sequence o1 = ⌞⌟, i1j1,⊥,
we can still conclude in a similar way that 13 Pra(A1 |d1) = Prm(o1 |d1) and 13 Pra(A1 |d2) = Prm(o1 |d2).
Induction step: Assume we have ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d1) = Prm(on |d1) and ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d2) =
Prm(on |d2) with n symbols in An = ⊥⊥...⊥. If we observe An+1 = ⊥⊥...⊤ with n + 1 sym-
bols in the algorithm, by induction hypothesis, we can immediately conclude that with on =
⌞⌟, i1j1,⊥, i2j2,⊥, ..., in jn ,⊥, ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d1) = Prm(on |d1) and ( 13 )2n+1 Pra(An |d2) = Prm(on |d2).
Since the last symbol in An is ⊥, new query fn+1 must be posed in the algorithm and the new
query results in+1, jn+1 are going to be perturbed and compared with the perturbed threshold.
In the hmm model, after observing the nth ⊥ in the current distribution, transition to the new
distribution occurs where states t˜t ′rin+1 and t˜t ′r jn+1 having non-zero probabilities, with transition
probability 13 . And the common observation in theses states is in+1jn+1 with observing probability
1
3 . Then queries are further perturbed and we only filter the states t˜t ′r˜k ′ where the perturbed
query results are above the perturbed threshold, with the common observation ⊤. Since we fol-
low the steps of the algorithm to make transitions and add two multipliers of 13 , we can con-
clude that under the sequence on+1 = on , in+1jn+1,⊤, ( 13 )2(n+1)+1 Pra(An+1 |d1) = Prm(on+1 |d1) and
( 13 )2(n+1)+1 Pra(An+1 |d2) = Prm(on+1 |d2).
Note that the abovemapping process is one-to-one correspondence. Thus the proof is finished. □
Then we can prove the differential privacy results.
Theorem 10.2. The model used in Fig. 3 satisfies ϵ−differential privacy, i.e, Algorithm 1 returns
“unsat” for all the feasible observation sequences of lengths k , if and only if Algorithm 4 satisfies
ϵ−differential privacy.
Proof. Feasible observation sequences of lengths k mean that Algorithm 1 only checks paths
that could represent complete execution paths of the Algorithm 4. For instance k can’t be 1, which
only represents the initial distributions of two databases in Fig. 3. Moreover, the observation
sequences can’t contain any of symbols ♠, ♥, ♦, ♣: paths contain these symbols don’t represent
practical executions in the Algorithm 4. Since one of the neighboring data distributions must have
probability 0 for the unique appearance of these symbols in the half part of Fig. 3, to filter out these
observation paths, one just needs to add constraints that the observation probabilities can’t be
strictly equal to 0.
“If” direction: If the algorithm satisfies ϵ−differential privacy, the probabilities of observing any
length of outputs A = ⊥⊥...⊤ are mathematically similar starting from neighboring databases, d1
and d2. That is,
e−ϵ Pr
a
(A|d2) ≤ Pr
a
(A|d1) ≤ eϵ Pr
a
(A|d2). (6)
Using Lemma 10.1, we can directly conclude that
e−ϵ Pr
m
(o |d2) ≤ Pr
m
(o |d1) ≤ eϵ Pr
m
(o |d2). (7)
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Here d1, d2 and o correspond to d1, d2 and A in Lemma 10.1. Since A can be any possible output,
each can be mapped into an observation sequence , which makes up all the feasible observation
sequences in the model. This actually verifies that our model satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
“Only if” direction: If the algorithm doesn’t satisfy ϵ−differential privacy, there’s a sequence
A = ⊥⊥...⊤ with observing probabilities differing too much from initial distribution d1 and d2.
By applying the similar analysis procedure, we can prove that the model in Fig. 3 doesn’t satisfy
ϵ−differential privacy. □
